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Abstract
In previous studies classification algorithms were employed successfully for the
detection of unknown malicious code. Most of these studies extracted features based
on byte n-gram patterns in order to represent the inspected files. In this study we
represent the inspected files using OpCode n-gram patterns which are extracted from
the files after disassembly. The OpCode n-gram patterns are used as features for the
classification process. The classification process main goal is to detect unknown
malware within a set of suspected files which will later be included in antivirus
software as signatures. A rigorous evaluation was performed using a test collection
comprising of more than 30,000 files, in which various settings of OpCode n-gram
patterns of various size representations and eight types of classifiers were evaluated.
A typical problem of this domain is the imbalance problem in which the distribution
of the classes in real life varies. We investigated the imbalance problem, referring to
several real-life scenarios in which malicious files are expected to be about 10% of
the total inspected files. Lastly, we present a chronological evaluation in which the
frequent need for updating the training set was evaluated. Evaluation results indicate
that the evaluated methodology achieves a level of accuracy higher than 96% (with
TPR above 0.95 and FPR approximately 0.1), which slightly improves the results in
previous studies that use byte n-gram representation. The chronological evaluation
showed a clear trend in which the performance improves as the training set is more
updated.
Keywords: Malicious Code Detection, OpCode, Data Mining, Classification
1. Introduction
Modern computer and communication infrastructures are highly susceptible to various
types of attacks. A common method of launching these attacks is by means of malicious
software (malware) such as worms, viruses, and Trojan horses, which, when spread, can
cause severe damage to private users, commercial companies and governments. The
recent growth in high-speed Internet connections enable malware to propagate and
infect hosts very quickly, therefore it is essential to detect and eliminate new (unknown)
malware in a prompt manner [1].
Anti-virus vendors are facing huge quantities (thousands) of suspicious files every
day [2]. These files are collected from various sources including dedicated honeypots,
third party providers and files reported by customers either automatically or explicitly.
The large amount of files makes efficient and effective inspection of files particularly
challenging. Our main goal in this study is to be able to filter out unknown malicious
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files from the files arriving to an anti-virus vendor every day. For that, we investigate
the approach of representing malicious files by OpCode expressions as features in the
classification task.
Several analysis techniques for detecting malware, which commonly distinguished
between dynamic and static, have been proposed. In dynamic analysis (also known as
behavioral analysis) the detection of malware consists of information that is collected
from the operating system at runtime (i.e., during the execution of the program) such
as system calls, network access and files and memory modifications [3-7]. This
approach has several disadvantages. First, it is difficult to simulate the appropriate con-
ditions in which the malicious functions of the program, such as the vulnerable appli-
cation that the malware exploits, will be activated. Secondly, it is not clear what is the
required period of time needed to observe the appearance of the malicious activity for
each malware.
In static analysis, information about the program or its expected behavior consists of
explicit and implicit observations in its binary/source code. The main advantage of sta-
tic analysis is that it is able to detect a file without actually executing it and thereby
providing rapid classification [8].
Static analysis solutions are primarily implemented using the signature-based method
which relies on the identification of unique strings in the binary code [2]. While being
very precise, signature-based methods are useless against unknown malicious code [9].
Thus, generalization of the detection methods is crucial in order to be able to detect
unknown malware before its execution. Recently, classification algorithms were
employed to automate and extend the idea of heuristic-based methods. In these meth-
ods the binary code of a file is represented, for example, using byte sequence (i.e., byte
n-grams), and classifiers are used to learn patterns in the code in order to classify new
(unknown) files as malicious or benign [1,10]. Recent studies, which we survey in the
next section, have shown that by using byte n-grams to represent the binary file fea-
tures, classifiers with very accurate classification results can be trained, yet there still
remains room for improvement.
In this paper, which is an extended version of [11], we use a methodology for mal-
ware categorization by implementing concepts from the text categorization domain, as
was presented by part of the authors in [12]. While most of the previous studies
extracted features which are based on byte n-grams [12,13], in this study, we use
OpCode n-gram patterns, generated by disassembling the inspected executable files, to
represent the files. Unlike byte sequence, OpCode expressions, extracted from the
executable file, are expected to provide a more meaningful representation of the code.
In the analogy to text categorization, using letters or sequences of letters as features is
analogous to using byte sequences, while using words or sequences of words is analo-
gous to the OpCode sequences.
Another important aspect when using binary classifiers for the detection of unknown
malicious code is the imbalance problem. The imbalance problem refers to scenarios
in which the proportions of the classes are not equal. Previous studies presented eva-
luations based on test collections having similar proportions of malicious and benign
files in the test collections. These proportions do not reflect real-life situations in
which malicious code is significantly lower than 50% and therefore might report opti-
mistic results. As a case in point, a recent McAfee survey [14] indicates that about 4%
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of search results from the major search engines on the web contain malicious code.
Additionally, Shin et al. [15] found that above 15% of the files in the KaZaA network
contained malicious code.
We rigorously evaluate the framework that is suggested in this paper, using a test
collection containing more than 30,000 files, in order to determine the optimal settings
of the framework. Additionally, we investigate the imbalance problem and evaluate
through various malicious-benign proportions, the best settings for a training set given
a test set.
Another aspect in the maintenance of such a framework is the importance of updat-
ing the training set with new known malicious files. This is intuitively important,
because the purpose of malicious files changes over time and accordingly the patterns
within the code. Moreover, these malicious files are written in varying frameworks
which result in differing patterns. However, it is not clear to what extent it is essential
to retrain the classifier with the new files. For this purpose we designed a chronological
experiment, based on a dataset including files from the years 2000 to 2007, trained
each time on files untill year k and tested on the following years.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We begin in section 2 with a survey of
previous relevant studies. Section 3 describes the methods we used, including concepts
from text categorization, data preparation, and classifiers. In sections 4 and 5 we pre-
sent the evaluation and the evaluation results. Lastly, section 6 discusses the results
and future work.
2. Background
2.1 Detecting Unknown Malware using Byte N-Grams Patterns
Over the past decade, several studies have focused on the detection of unknown mal-
ware based on its binary code content. The authors of [16] were the first to introduce
the idea of applying Machine Learning (ML) methods for the detection of different
malwares based on their respective binary codes. Three different feature extraction
(FE) approaches were employed: features extracted from the Portable Executable (PE)
section, meaningful plain-text strings that are encoded in programs files, and byte
sequence features.
Abou-Assaleh et al. [13] introduced a framework that uses the Common N-Gram
(CNG) method and the k-nearest neighbor (KNN) classifier for the detection of
malware. For each malicious and benign class a representative profile was constructed.
A new executable file was compared with the profiles of malicious and benign classes,
and was assigned to the most similar.
Kotler and Maloof [17] also used byte n-grams representation, however the vector of
n-gram features was binary, presenting the presence or absence of a feature in the file
and ignoring the frequency of feature appearances (in the file). In an extension of their
previous study, Kolter and Maloof [18] classified malware into families (multiple
classes) based on the functions in their respective payloads. In attempts to estimate
their ability to detect malicious codes based on their issue dates, these techniques were
trained on files issued before July 2003, and then tested on files issued from that point
in time through August 2004.
Cai et al. [19] conducted several experiments in which they evaluated the combina-
tions of seven feature selection methods, three classifiers, and byte n-gram size.
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Recently, Moskovitch et al. [12] published the results of a study which used a test
collection containing more than 30,000 files, in which the files were represented by
byte n-grams. Additionally, an investigation of the imbalance problem, on which we
elaborate later, was demonstrated. In this paper we present the results of an alternative
representation of the executable files using OpCode n-gram patterns instead of using
byte n-gram patterns.
2.2 Representing Executables using OpCodes
An OpCode (short for operational code) is the portion of a machine language instruc-
tion that specifies the operation to be performed. A complete machine language
instruction contains an OpCode and, optionally, the specification of one or more oper-
ands. The operations of an OpCode may include arithmetic, data manipulation, logical
operations, and program control.
The OpCodes, being the building blocks of machine language, have been used for stati-
cally analyzing application behavior and detecting malware. Karim et al. [20] addressed
the tracking of malware evolution based on OpCode sequences and permutations. Data
mining methods (Logistic Regression, Artificial Neural Networks and Decision Trees) are
used in [21] to automatically identify critical instruction sequences that can distinguish
between malicious and benign programs. The evaluation showed a high accuracy level of
98.4%. Bilar [22] examines the difference of statistical OpCode frequency distribution in
malicious and non-malicious code. A total of 67 malware executables were compared with
the aggregate statistics of 20 non-malicious samples. The results show that malicious soft-
ware OpCode distributions differ significantly from non-malicious software and suggests
that the method can be used to detect malicious code. The approach in [22] presents a
single case in our methodology; in this paper we test several OpCode n-gram sizes while
Bilar [22] used only 1-gram. Based on our experiments, using OpCode sequences
improves the detection performance significantly. Santos et al. [23] used the OpCode
n-grams (of size n=1,2) representation to ascribe malware instances to their families by
measuring the similarity between files. This is, however, different from our goal in which
we attempt to classify unknown suspicious files as malicious or benign in order to detect
new malware.
Our approach also stems from the idea that there are families of malware such that two
members of the same family share a common “engine.” Moreover, there are malware gen-
eration utilities which use a common engine to create new malware instances; this engine
may even be used to polymorph the threat as it propagates. When searching for such
common engines among known malware, one must be aware that malware designers will
attempt to hide such engines using a broad range of techniques. For example, these com-
mon engines may be located in varying locations inside the executables, and thus may be
mapped to different addresses in memory or even perturbed slightly. To overcome such
practices, we suggest disregarding any parameters of the OpCodes. We believe that disre-
garding the parameters would provide a more general representation of the files, which is
expected to be more effective for purposes of classification into benign and malicious files.
2.3 The Imbalance Problem
The class imbalance problem was first introduced to the ML research community a little
over a decade ago [24]. Typically, the class imbalance problem occurs when there are
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significantly more instances from one class relative to other classes. In such cases the
classifier tends to misclassify the instances of the less represented classes. More and
more researchers realized that the performance of their classifiers may be sub-optimal
due to the fact that the datasets are not balanced. This problem is even more relevant in
fields where the natural datasets are highly imbalanced in the first place [25], as in the
problem we describe.
Over the years, the ML community has addressed the issue of class imbalance
following two general strategies. The first strategy, which is classifier-independent, con-
sists of balancing the original data-set by using different kinds of undersampling or
oversampling approaches. In particular, researchers have experimented with random
(e.g., [26]), directed (e.g., [24,26]), and artificial sampling [27]. The second strategy
involves modifying the classifiers in order to adapt them to the data-sets. In particular,
these approaches search for methods for incorporating misclassification costs into the
classification process and assigning higher misclassification costs to the minority class
so as to compensate for its small size. This was done for a variety of classifiers such as
Artificial Neural Networks [28], Random Forests [29], and SVM [30].
In our case, the data is imbalanced in real-life conditions and reflected by the test-set
in our experiments, therefore, we would like to understand the optimal construction of
a training-set for achieving the best performance in real-life conditions. Similarly to
the work of [31], in our research we also consider the question of what is the appropri-
ate proportion of examples of each class (benign and malicious) for learning if only a
limited number of training instances can be used altogether. Their work considers the
case of Decision Trees induction on 26 different data-sets. We, on the other hand,
focus on the single problem of interest here–malware detection–but consider eight
different classifiers.
Another relevant issue to the research which emanates from the class imbalance pro-
blem concerns the choice of an evaluation metric. When faced with unequal class
sizes, classification accuracy is often an inappropriate measure of performance. Indeed,
in such circumstances, a trivial classifier that predicts every case as the majority class
could achieve very high accuracy levels in extremely skewed domains. Several propo-
sals have been made to address this issue including the decomposition of accuracy into
its basic components [25], the use of ROC analysis [32] or the G-Mean [33]. In this
paper we chose to decompose accuracy into basic components in addition to the use
of the G-mean. This approach is conceptually simpler than using ROC analysis and
sheds sufficient light on our results. The details of the evaluation measures we used
will be given in Section 5.1.
3. Methods
The goal of our work was to explore methods of using data mining techniques in order
to create accurate detectors for new (unseen) binaries. The overall process of classify-
ing unknown files as either benign or malicious using ML methods is divided into two
subsequent phases: training and testing. In the training phase, a training-set of benign
and malicious files is provided to the system. Each file is then parsed and a vector
representing each file is extracted based on a pre-determined vocabulary (which can be
an outcome of setup feature selection process). The representative vectors of the files
in the training set and their real (known) classification are the input for a learning
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algorithm (such as a Decision Tree or Artificial Neural Network algorithms). By
processing these vectors, the learning algorithm trains a classifier. Next, during the
testing phase, a test-set collection of new benign and malicious files which did not
appear in the training-set are classified by the classifier that was generated in the train-
ing phase. Each file in the test-set is first parsed and the representative vector is
extracted using the same vocabulary as in the training phase. Based on this vector, the
classifier will classify the file as either benign or malicious. In the testing phase the per-
formance of the generated classifier is evaluated by extracting standard accuracy mea-
sures for classifiers. Thus, it is necessary to know the real class of the files in the test-
set in order to compare their real class with the class that was derived by the classifier.
3.2 Dataset Creation
We created a dataset of malicious and benign executables for the Windows operating
system, the system most commonly used and attacked today. This malicious and
benign file collection was previously used in [12]. We acquired 7,688 malicious files
from the VX Heaven website [34]. To identify the files, we used the Kaspersky anti-
virus. Benign files, including executable and DLL (Dynamic Linked Library) files, were
gathered from machines running the Windows XP operating system on our campus.
The benign set contained 22,735 files. The Kaspersky anti-virus program was used to
verify that these files did not contain any malicious code.
Some of the files in our collection were either compressed or packed. These files
could not be disassembled by disassembler software and therefore, after converting the
files into OpCode representation we ended up with 5,677 malicious and 20,416 benign
files (total of 26,093 files).
Code obfuscation is a prominent technique used by hackers in order to avoid detec-
tion by security mechanisms (e.g., anti-viruses and intrusion detection systems) [35].
These techniques are also applied on benign software for copyrights protection pur-
poses. Packing and compressing files can be achieved by using off-the-shelf packers
such as Armadillo, UPX and Themida. In such cases, static analysis methods might fail
to correctly classify a packed malware [36]. Several solutions to the challenge of packed
code were suggested (e.g., Ether [36], McBoost [37], PolyUnpack [38]). These methods
were proposed for automatic unpacking of packed files by applying either static or
dynamic analysis. Evaluation performed in these studies showed that unpacking files
before being classified increase the classification accuracy [37,38]. Our proposed
method can use such an approach in order to overcome packed files. In addition, we
would like to point out that classifying benign files is also useful and can reduce the
load of inspecting suspicious (or unknown) files. Also, the large number of malware
files in our dataset that could be dissembled indicates that in order to appear benign
and to pass security mechanisms (that are configured to block content that is
encrypted\obfuscated and cannot be inspected), these techniques are not always used
by hackers.
3.3 Data Preparation and Feature Selection
To classify the files we had to convert them into a vectorial representation. We had
two representations, the known one, often called byte n-grams, which consists of byte
sequences of characters extracted from the binary code [12], and the second OpCode
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n-grams represented by sequences of OpCodes. Using a disassembler software, we
extracted a sequence of OpCodes from each file representing execution flow of
machine operations. Subsequently, several OpCode n-gram lengths were considered
where each n-gram was composed of n sequential OpCodes. This process is presented
in Figure 1.
The process of streamlining an executable starts with disassembling it. The disassem-
bly process consists of translating the machine code instructions stored in the executa-
ble to a more human-readable language, namely, Assembly language. The next and
final step in streamlining the executable is achieved by extracting the sequence of
OpCodes generated during the disassembly process. The extracting of sequences is in
the same logical order in which the OpCodes appear in the executable, disregarding
the extra information available (e.g., memory location, registers, etc.)
Although such a process seems trivial, malware writers often try to prevent the suc-
cessful application of the disassembly process to prevent experts from analyzing their
malwares. In this study we used IDA-Pro, the most advanced commercial disassembly
program available today. IDA-Pro implements sophisticated techniques which enabled
us to disassemble most of our malware collection successfully (approximately 74% of
the malware files).
The size of vocabularies (number of distinct n-grams) extracted for the OpCode
n-grams representation were of 515, 39,011, 443,730, 1,769,641, 5,033,722 and
11,948,491, for 1-gram, 2-gram, 3-gram, 4-gram, 5-gram and 6-gram, respectively.
Later, the normalized term frequency (TF) and TF inverse document frequency (TFIDF)
representations were calculated for each OpCode n-grams patterns in each file. The
TF and TFIDF are well known measures in the text categorization field [39]. In our
domain, each n-gram is analogous to a word (or a term) in a text document. The nor-
malized TF is calculated by dividing the frequency of the term in the document by the
Figure 1 Converting byte representation into OpCode n-grams patterns.
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frequency of the most frequent term in a document. The TFIDF combines the
frequency of a term in the document (TF) and its frequency in the whole document
collection, denoted by document frequency (DF). The term’s (normalized) TF value is
multiplied by the IDF = log (N/DF), where N is the number of documents in the entire
file collection and DF is the number of files in which it appears.
The TF representation is actually the representation which was used in previous
papers in the domain of malicious code classification [13,16,17], where counting words
was replaced by byte n-grams extracted from the executable files. However, in the tex-
tual domain, it was shown that the TFIDF is a richer and more successful representa-
tion for the retrieval and categorization purposes [39] and thus we expected that using
the TFIDF weighting would lead to better performance than the TF.
In ML applications, the large number of features (many of which do not contribute
to the accuracy and may even decrease it) in many domains presents a significant pro-
blem. In our study, the reduction of the number of features is crucial and must be per-
formed while maintaining a high level of accuracy. This is due to the fact that the
vocabulary size may exceed millions of features; far more than can be processed by
any feature selection tool within a reasonable period of time. Additionally, it is impor-
tant to identify the terms that appear in most of the files in order to avoid vectors that
contain many zeros. Thus, we first extracted the 1,000 features (i.e., OpCode n-grams
patterns) with the highest Document Frequency values and on which three feature
selection methods were later applied.
The three feature selection methods operate according to the filters approach [40]. In
a filters approach method, a measure is used to quantify the correlation of each feature
to the class (malicious or benign) and estimate its expected contribution to the classifi-
cation task. The feature measure that is used by the feature selection method is inde-
pendent of any classification algorithm, thus allowing us to compare the performances
of the different classification algorithms. We used the Document Frequency measure
DF (the amount of files in which the term appeared), Gain Ratio (GR) [40] and Fisher
Score (FS) [41]. Based on each feature selection measure we selected the top 50, 100,
200 and 300 features.
Using the selected features, we evaluated eight commonly used classification algo-
rithms: Support Vector Machine (SVM) [42], Logistic Regression (LR) [43], Random
Forest (RF) [44], Artificial Neural Networks (ANN) [45], Decision Trees (DT) [46],
Naïve Bayes (NB) [47], and their boosted versions, BDT and BNB [48]. We used the
WEKA implementation of these methods [49].
4 Evaluation
4.1 Research Questions
We set out to evaluate the use of OpCodes patterns for the purpose of unknown mali-
cious code detection through three main experiments. When designing these experi-
ments our objective was to investigate the usage of OpCode for unknown malcode
detection while considering various strategies and settings of the framework. We sum-
marize the research goals in six questions:
1. Which term-representation is better: TF or TFIDF?
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2. Which OpCode n-gram size is the best: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 or 6? or a combination of
OpCode n-gram sizes?
3. Which top-selection (number of features) is the best: 50, 100, 200 or 300 and
which features selection method: DF, FS and GR is superior?
4. Which classifier is the best: SVM, LR, RF, ANN, DT, BDT, NB or BNB?
5. What is the best Malicious File Percentage (MFP) in the training set for varying
MFP in the test set?
6. How often should a classifier be trained with recent malicious files in order to
improve the detection accuracy of new malicious files?
To answer the above questions we first performed a wide set of experiments to iden-
tify the best term representation, n-gram size, top-selection and feature selection
method. After determining the optimal settings when using the OpCode representa-
tion, we compared the achieved accuracy to the byte n-gram representation used in
[12]. In the second experiment we investigated the imbalance problem to determine
the optimal settings of the training set for each classifier in varying “real-life” condi-
tions. Finally, in the third experiment, we performed a chronological evaluation to
determine how well a classifier, which was trained on past examples, can detect new
malicious file and to investigate the importance and need in updating the training set
frequently.
For evaluation purposes, we used the True Positive Rate (TPR) measure, which is the
number of positive instances classified correctly, False Positive Rate (FPR), which is the
number of negative instances misclassified, and the Total Accuracy, which measures
the number of absolutely correctly classified instances, either positive or negative,
divided by the entire number of instances. For the imbalance analysis, where the accu-
racy measure can sometimes be misleading, we also computed the G-Means measure.
This measure, which is often used in imbalance dataset evaluation studies, is a metric
that combines both the sensitivity and specificity by calculating their geometric mean.
5 Experiments and Results
5.1 Experiment 1 - evaluate OpCode n-gram representations settings
In the first experiment we aimed to answer the first four research questions presented
in section 4.1. In accordance to these questions, we wanted to identify the best settings
of the classification framework which is determined by a combination of: (1) the term-
representation (TF or TFIDF); (2) the OpCode n-gram size (1, 2, 3, 4, 5 or 6); (3) the
top-selection of features (50, 100, 200 or 300); (4) the feature selection method (DF, FS
or GR); and (5) the classifier (SVM, LR, RF, ANN, DT, BDT, NB or BNB). We
designed a wide and comprehensive set of evaluation runs, including all the combina-
tions of the optional settings for each of the aspects, amounting to 1,152 runs in a
5-fold cross validation format for all eight classifiers. The files in the test-set were not
in the training set, presenting unknown files to the classifier. In this experiment, the
Malicious File Percentage (MFP) in the training and test sets was set according to the
natural proportions in the file-set at approximately 22%.
5.1.1 Feature representation vs. n-grams
We first wanted to find the best terms representation (i.e., TF or TFIDF). Figure 2 pre-
sents the mean TPR, FPR, accuracy and G-Mean of the combinations of the term
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representation and n-grams size. The mean TPRs, FPRs, accuracies and G-Means of
the TF and the TFIDF were quite identical, which is good because maintaining the
TFIDF requires additional computational efforts each time a malcode or benign files
are added to the collection. This can be explained by the fact that for each n-gram
size, the top 1,000 OpCode n-grams, having the highest Document Frequency (DF)
value, were selected. This was done in order to avoid problems related to sparse data
(i.e., vectors that contain many zeros). Consequently, the selected OpCode n-grams
appear in both sets and therefore eliminate the IDF factor in the TF-IDF measure.
Following this observation we opted to use the TF representation for the rest of our
experiments.
Interestingly, the best n-gram size of OpCodes was the 2-gram with the highest
accuracy and G-Mean values and the lowest FPR (and with TPR similar but slightly
lower from the 3-gram). This signifies that the sequence of two OpCodes is more
representative than single OpCodes, however, longer grams decreased the accuracy.
This observation can be explained by the fact that longer OpCode n-grams indicates
larger vocabulary (since there are more combinations of the n-grams), yet on the other
hand, a large number of n-grams results in fewer appearances in many files, thus creat-
ing sparse vectors. As a case in point, we extracted 443,730 3-grams and 1,769,641
4-grams. In such cases, where many of the vectors are sparse, the detection accuracy
will be decreased.
Figure 2 The mean TPR, FPR, accuracy and G-Mean for each term representation (TF and TFIDF) as
a function of the OpCode n-gram size. While the mean TPRs, FPRs, accuracies and G-Means of the TF
and TFIDF were quite identical, the mean accuracy and G-Mean of the 2-gram outperforms all the other n-
grams with the lowest FPR.
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5.1.2 Feature Selections and Top Selections
To identify the best feature selection method and the top number of features, we calcu-
lated the mean TPR, FPR, accuracy and G-Mean of each method, as shown in Figure 3.
Generally, DF outperformed on all sizes of top features, while FS performed very well,
especially when fewer top features were used (top 50 and top 100). Moreover, the DF
and FS performance was more stable for varying numbers of top feature in terms accu-
racy and G-Mean. The DF is a simple feature selection method which favors features
which appear in most of the files. This can be explained by its criterion, which has an
advantage for fewer features. In other methods, the lack of appearances in many files
might create zeroed vectors and might consequently lead to a lower accuracy level.
5.1.3 Classifiers
Figure 4 depicts the mean TPR, FPR, accuracy and G-Mean for each classifier as a
function of the OpCode n-gram size using the TF representation. The performance of
both the Naïve Bayes and the Boosted Naïve Bayes was the worst for all the n-gram
sizes, having the lowest mean TPR, accuracy and G-Mean, and highest mean FPR. The
remaining the classifiers performed very well, having the Random Forest, Boosted
Decision Trees and Decision Trees outperforming. The mean accuracy, TPR and
G-Mean of the 2-gram outperforms all the other n-grams with the lowest mean FPR
for all classifiers, but not significantly.
Figure 3 The mean TPR, FPR, accuracy and G-Mean of the evaluated feature selection methods
(Document Frequency, Fisher Score, Gain Ratio) as a function of the number of top features (50,
100, 200 and 300). DF was accurate for all sizes of top features. FS performed very well, especially when
fewer features were used (top 50 and top 100).
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Classifiers differ in performance within different domains and the best fitted classifier
can often be identified by experimentation. From the results we conclude that for this
problem domain, complex classifiers, such as the ensemble Random Forest algorithm
[44] which induces many decision trees and then combines the results of all trees, and
the boosted decision tree [48] generate a more accurate classifier.
Additionally, in order to compare the classifiers’ performance, we selected the set-
tings which had the highest mean accuracy level over all the classifiers. In order to
find the best settings for all the classifiers, we calculated the mean FPR, TPR, accuracy
and G-Mean for each setting that is defined by the: (1) n-gram size; (2) feature repre-
sentation; (3) feature selection method; and (4) the number of top features. Table 1
depicts the top five settings with the highest mean accuracy level (averaged over all the
Figure 4 The mean TPR, FPR, accuracy and G-Mean for each classifier (using TF representation) as
a function of the OpCode n-gram size. The performance of both the Naïve Bayes and the Boosted
Naïve Bayes was worst for all n-gram sizes having the lowest mean TPR, accuracy and G-Mean and highest
mean FPR. The mean accuracy, TPR and G-Mean of the 2-gram outperforms all the other n-grams with the
lowest mean FPR for all classifiers.
Table 1 The top five settings with the highest mean accuracy over all the classifiers.
n-gram size Representation Feature selection Top features FPR TPR Accuracy G-Mean
2 TF DF 300 0.045 0.744 0.911 0.840
2 TFIDF DF 300 0.045 0.744 0.911 0.840
2 TF DF 100 0.053 0.754 0.907 0.845
2 TFIDF DF 100 0.053 0.754 0.907 0.845
2 TF DF 200 0.047 0.729 0.906 0.830
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classifiers). The outperforming setting was the: 2-gram, TF, using 300 features selected
by the DF measure.
The results of each classifier when using the best mean settings (i.e., -gram, TF,
using 300 features selected by the DF measure), including the accuracy, TPR, FPR and
G-Mean are presented in Table 2. In addition, the optimal setting of each classifier is
presented, as well as the resulted accuracy for the optimal setting, and the difference
compared to the accuracy achieved with the best averaged setting. The comparisons
show that for all classifiers, excluding the NB and BNB, the best averaged setting yields
similar performance.
The graphs in Figure 5 depict the TPR, FPR, accuracy and G-Mean of each classifier
when comparing the best averaged settings (2-gram, TF representation, using 300 fea-
tures selected by the DF measure) with the classifier’s optimal settings. The graphs
show that the Random Forest and Boosted Decision Tree yielded the highest accuracy
and lowest FPR. Naïve Bayes and Boosted Naïve Bayes performed poorly and thus we
omitted them from the following experiments.
In the following two experiments we used the best six classifiers (RF, DT, BDT, LR,
ANN, SVM) when trained on the best averaged settings (2-gram, TF representation,
300 top features selected by the DF measure).
5.1.4 Varying OpCode n-grams sizes
In this analysis we set out to answer the second part of research question 2 and to
understand whether a combination of different sizes of OpCode n-grams, as features in
the classification task, may result in better detection performance. For this we used
three OpCode n-grams sets on which the three feature selection methods were applied
with four top-selections (50, 100, 200 or 300):
- Constant n-gram size This option refers to the 6 OpCode n-grams sets that were
used in the previous experiments, in which the n-grams in each set are of the same
size (1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6).
- Top 1,800 over all n-gram sizes In this set, all OpCode n-grams, of all sizes, were
sorted according to their DF value. Then, the first 1,800 n-grams with the top DF score
were selected. Feature selection was applied on the collection of 1,800 n-grams patterns.
- Top 300 for each n-gram size In this set, for each OpCode n-gram size (1- to
6-gram), the first 300 n-grams with the top DF score were selected (i.e., total of 1,800
n-grams). Feature selection was applied on the collection of 1,800 n-grams patterns.
Table 2 The accuracy, FPR, TPR and G-Mean of each classifier when using the best mean
settings (i .e., 2-gram, TF representation, top 300 features selected by the DF measure).
Classifier Best averaged settings Classifier optimal settings Difference in accuracy
Accuracy TPR FPR G-Means Optimal settings Accuracy
RF 95.146 0.843 0.020 0.909 6-gram; TF; GR; top300 95.375 0.229
BDT 94.436 0.850 0.031 0.908 2-gram; TF; FS; top300 94.649 0.213
DT 93.009 0.835 0.045 0.893 2-gram; TF; FS; top300 93.741 0.732
LR 92.965 0.819 0.041 0.886 2-gram; TF; DF; top300 92.965 0.000
ANN 92.136 0.785 0.043 0.867 3-gram; TF; DF; top300 92.199 0.063
SVM 92.136 0.785 0.043 0.867 3-gram; TF; DF; top300 92.199 0.063
NB 84.537 0.517 0.068 0.694 5-gram; TF; FS; top50 85.802 1.265
BNB 84.537 0.517 0.068 0.694 2-gram; TF; DF; top50 86.683 2.146
The table also depicts the optimal settings of each classifier and the difference in accuracy with the averaged settings.
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The distribution of n-grams sizes for the two n-grams sets that consist of varying n-
gram sizes is presented in Table 3. From the table we can see, as expected, that the DF
feature selection method favors short n-grams which appear in a larger number of files.
In addition, we can see that in most cases, FS and GR tend to select n-grams of size 2,
3 and 4 which we conclude to be more informative and with a tendency to discrimi-
nate better between the malicious and benign classes in the classification task.
In Figure 6 we present the mean TPR, FPR, accuracy and G-Mean of each classifier
when using the best mean settings obtained for each of the three OpCode n-grams
patterns sets:
- Constant n-gram size 2-gram, TF representation, 300 features selected by the DF
measure (as presented in section 5.1.3) - denoted by [2gram;TF;Top300;DF].
- Top 1,800 over all n-gram sizes TF representation, 300 features selected by the GR
measure - denoted by [Top1800All;TF;Top300;GR].
- Top 300 for each n-gram size TF representation, 300 features selected by the GR
measure - denoted by [Top300Each; TF;Top300;GR].
The results show that using various sizes of OpCode n-grams patterns does not
improve the detection performance and in fact for most classifiers, the performance
accuracy was deteriorated. We therefore use the constant n-gram size sets for the next
experiments.
Figure 5 TPR, FPR, Accuracy and G-Mean of each classifier when comparing the best averaged
settings (i.e., 2-gram, TF representation, 300 features selected by the DF measure) and the
classifier’s optimal settings.
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5.2 Experiment 2 - The imbalance problem
In our second experiment, we addressed our 5th research question in order to find the
best Malicious File Percentage (MFP) among the training-set files for varying MFP in
the test-set files, and more specifically, for low MFP in the test-set (10-15%), which
resembles a real-life scenario. We created five levels of Malicious Files Percentage
(MFP) in the training set (5, 10, 15, 30, and 50%). For example, when referring to 15%,
we assert that 15% of the files in the training set were malicious and 85% were benign.
The test-set represents the real-life situation while the training set represents the set-
up of the classifier, which is controlled. We had the same MFP levels for the test-sets
as well. Thus, we ran all the product combinations of five training sets and five test-
sets for a total of 25 runs for each classifier. The dataset was divided into two parts.
Each time the training set was chosen from one part and the test set was chosen from
the other part, thus forming a 2-fold cross validation-like evaluation to render the
results more significant.
Training-Set Malware Percentage
Figure 7 presents the mean accuracy, FPR, TPR, and G-Mean (i.e., averaged over all
the MFP levels in the test-sets) of each classifier and for each training MFP level. It is
shown that all classifiers, excluding ANN, had a similar trend and perform better when
using MFP of 15% - 30% in the training set, while Random Forest and Boosted Deci-
sion Tree outperformed all other classifiers exceeding 94.5% accuracy and 87.1% TPR,
while keeping the FPR bellow 4%. The ANN performance was generally low and
dropped significantly for 5%, 15% and 50% MFP in the training set. Additionally, it is
shown that the FPR grows for all classifiers with the increasing of the MFP in the
training set. This can be explained by the fact that for training sets with higher MFP
most of the test sets are have a lower MFP, which in turn results in higher FPR. This
in fact emphasizes the imbalance problem.
10% Malware Percentage in the Test-Set
we consider the 10% MFP level in the test-set to be a reasonable real-life scenario, as
mentioned in the introduction. Figure 8 presents the mean accuracy, FPR, TPR and G-
Mean for a 2-fold cross validation experiment for each MFP in the training set and
Table 3 Distribution of n-gram sizes, chosen by each feature selection method, for the
two n-grams sets that consist of varying n-grams sizes.
Top 1800 over all n-grams Top 300 for each n-gram size
Feature selection Top features 1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4 5 6
DF 50 0.3 0.42 0.24 0.04 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
DF 100 0.17 0.39 0.28 0.13 0.03 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
DF 200 0.11 0.27 0.36 0.21 0.06 0.01 1 0 0 0 0 0
DF 300 0.08 0.25 0.34 0.23 0.09 0.01 1 0 0 0 0 0
FS 50 0.06 0.18 0.38 0.16 0.1 0.12 0.54 0.08 0.16 0.1 0.06 0.06
FS 100 0.03 0.17 0.36 0.26 0.12 0.06 0.43 0.12 0.19 0.1 0.11 0.05
FS 200 0.02 0.13 0.33 0.27 0.18 0.08 0.35 0.14 0.2 0.14 0.12 0.08
FS 300 0.02 0.1 0.3 0.3 0.21 0.08 0.3 0.15 0.2 0.15 0.11 0.08
GR 50 0 0.16 0.36 0.22 0.22 0.04 0.06 0.2 0.36 0.14 0.1 0.14
GR 100 0 0.12 0.33 0.29 0.17 0.09 0.03 0.19 0.36 0.23 0.11 0.08
GR 200 0.01 0.13 0.31 0.32 0.16 0.09 0.04 0.15 0.31 0.22 0.17 0.12
GR 300 0.01 0.17 0.3 0.28 0.15 0.08 0.04 0.14 0.28 0.24 0.18 0.13
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with a fixed level of 10% MFP in the test-set. These results are quite similar in their
magnitude to the results in Figure 7, although here the performance level was higher.
For the RF and BDT, the highest performance level was in 10% and 15% of MFP in
the training set, which is more similar to the MFP in the test-set.
Relations among MFPs in Training and Test-sets
Further to our results from the training-set point of view (Figures 7 and 8), we present a
detailed description of the accuracy, TPR and FPR for the MFP levels in the two sets in
a 3-dimensional presentation for each classifier (the graphs of the two best classifiers, RF
and BDT, are presented in Figure 9; the graphs of the rest of the classifiers are provided
in Additional file 1). Interestingly, a stable state is observed in the accuracy measure for
any MFP level. In addition, we can see that for a given MFP in the training set, the TPR
and the FPR of the classifiers are stable for any MFP level in the test set. This observa-
tion, which emphasizes the imbalance problem, signifies that in order to achieve a
desired TPR and FPR, only the training set can be considered and selecting the proper
MFP in the training set will ensure the desired TPR and FPR for any MFP in the test set.
When comparing these results with the results of the byte n-grams patterns experi-
ments in [12] we notice that in terms of accuracy, the byte n-grams classifiers are
more sensitive to varying MFP levels in the training and test-sets. In particular, the DT
and BDT classifiers behaved optimally when the MFP levels in the training-set and
test-set were similar. This observation may indicate an advantage of the OpCode
n-grams representation as being less sensitive to the levels of MFP in the two sets, or
Figure 6 Mean TPR, FPR, accuracy and G-Mean of each classifier when using the best mean
settings obtained for each of the three n-grams sets: [2gram;TF;Top300;DF], [Top1800All;TF;
Top300;GR] and [Top300Each;TF;Top300;GR].
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Figure 7 Mean accuracy, FPR, TRP and G-Mean (over all the MFP levels in the test-sets) for each
MFP in the training set. RF and BDT out-performed across the varying MFPs.
Figure 8 The mean accuracy, FPR, TPR and G-Mean for 10% MFP in the test-set, for each MFP in
the training set.
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more specifically in the test sets which represent the changes of proportions in real life
conditions.
5.3 Experiment 3 - Chronological Evaluation
In the third experiment, we addressed our 6th research question in order to understand
the need in updating the training set. The question asks how important it is to update
the repository of malicious and benign files and whether, for specific years, the files were
more contributive to the accuracy when introduced in the training set or in the test set.
In order to answer these questions we divided the entire test collection into years from
2000 to 2007, in which the files were created. We had 7 training sets, in which training
set k included samples from the year 2000 till year 200[k] (where k = 0,1,2..,6). Each
training set k was evaluated separately on each following year from 200[k+1] till 2007.
Clearly, the files in the test were not present in the training set. Figure 10 presents the
results with a 50% MFP in the training set and10% MFP in the testing set for the two
best classifiers BDT and RF (the graphs for the rest of the classifiers are provided in
Additional file 2). Out of the ANN classifier, all other classifiers observed similar
Figure 9 The mean Accuracy, TPR and FPR for different MFP levels in the training and test sets for
the two best classifiers BDT and RF (the graphs for the rest of the classifiers are provided in
Additional file 1).
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behavior in which higher TPR and lower FPR were achieved when training on newer
files. In fact, in all of the cases, the TPR was above 0.95 and FPR approximately 0.1
when training the models on a yearly basis. Finally, for all classifiers, when testing on
2007 examples, a significant decrease in the accuracy was observed; a fact that might
indicate that new types of malware were released during 2007.
6. Discussion and Conclusions
In this study we used OpCode n-gram patterns generated by disassembling the
inspected executable files to extract features from the inspected files. OpCode n-grams
are used as features during the classification process with the aim of identifying
unknown malicious code. We performed an extensive evaluation using a test collection
comprising more than 30,000 files. The evaluation consisted of three experiments.
In the first experiment, we found that the TFIDF representation has no added value
over the TF representation, which is not the case in many information retrieval appli-
cations. This is very important since using the TFIDF representation introduces
Figure 10 The results (accuracy, TPR and FPR) for with a 50% MFP on the training set and 10%
MFP on the test set for the two best classifiers BDT and RF (the rest of the classifiers are
presented in Additional file 2).
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additional computational challenges in the maintenance of the collection when it is
updated. In order to reduce the number of OpCode n-gram features, which ranges
from thousands to millions, we used the DF measure to select the top 1,000 features
and tested three feature selection methods. The 2-gram OpCodes outperformed the
others and the DF was the best feature selection method. We also evaluated the perfor-
mance of classifiers when using a constant size of OpCode n-grams versus using vary-
ing sizes of n-grams. The result of this experiment showed no improvement when
using OpCode n-grams of different sizes.
In the second experiment, we investigated the relationship between the Malicious
File Percentage (MFP) in the test-set, which represents real-life scenario, and in the
training set, which is used for training the classifier. In this experiment, we found that
there are classifiers which are relatively non-reactive to changes in the MFP level of
the test-set. In general, this indicates that in order to achieve a desired TPR and FPR,
only the training set can be considered and selecting the proper MFP in the training
set will ensure the desired TPR and FPR for any MFP in the test set.
In the third experiment we wanted to determine the importance of updating the
training set over time. Thus, we divided the test collection into years and evaluated
training sets of selected years on the next years. Evaluation results show that an update
in the training set is needed. Using 10% malicious files in the training set showed a
clear trend in which the performance improves when the training set is updated on a
yearly basis.
Based on the reported experiments and results, we suggest that when setting up a
classifier for real-life purposes, one should first use the OpCode representation and, if
the disassemble of the file is not feasible, use the byte representation [12], which
appears to be less accurate. In addition, one should consider the expected proportion
of malicious files in the stream of data. Seeing as we assume that in most real-life sce-
narios low proportions of malicious files are present, training sets should be designed
accordingly.
In future work we plan to experiment with cost-sensitive classification in which the
costs of the two types of errors (i.e., missing a malicious file and false alarm) are not
equal. We believe that the application of cost-sensitive classification depends on the
goals to be achieved, and accordingly the cost of having a misclassification of each
type. Having experience in using this approach in real life setting, we can give two gen-
eral examples of such applications. The first example pertains to for anti-virus compa-
nies that need to analyze dozens of thousands of maliciously suspected (or unknown)
files, including benign files, every day. In such an application the goal is to perform an
initial filtering to reduce the amount of files to investigate manually. Thus, having a
relatively high false-positive is reasonable in order to decrease the probability of miss-
ing an unknown malicious file. Another application is as an anti-virus. In this case we
would like to decrease the probability of false-negative, which will result in quarantin-
ing, deleting, or blocking of a legitimate file. For both scenarios it is difficult to assign
the costs for the two errors (note that each type of malware can be assigned with a dif-
ferent cost level based on the damage it causes) and therefore in this paper we focus
on exploring and identifying the settings and classifiers that can classify the files as
accurately as possible, leaving the cost-sensitive analysis for future work.
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Additional material
Additional file 1: Relations among MFPs in training and test-sets: accuracy, TPR and FPR for the MFP
levels in the two sets in a 3-dimensional presentation. Detailed description of the accuracy, TPR and FPR for
the malicious file percentage levels in the two sets in a 3-dimensional presentation for each classifier.
Additional file 2: Chronological evaluation: accuracy, TPR and FPR with a 50% MFP in the training set and
10% MFP in the testing set for all classifiers. Detailed description of the accuracy, TPR and FPR with a 50%
MFP in the training set and 10% MFP in the testing set for all classifiers.
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